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Nested Payment Intermediaries in the ACH Network: 
Risks and Responsibilities of ODFIs 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The rapid advancement of technology has stimulated innovation 
in electronic payment methods, but it has also created more 
opportunities for funds to be misappropriated and criminals to commit 
fraud.1 Increasingly, perpetrators of payments fraud  are  taking 
advantage of these technological developments to exploit customers, 
corporations, and financial institutions.2 Over the past decade, third- 
party entities have become more involved in the electronic payment 
sector by facilitating transactions between a customer and his bank.3 
Moreover, as the number of these payment intermediaries4 increases,  
the potential for fraud and error also escalates.5 
In response to nationwide reports of payments fraud, the United 
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Federal Trade Commission, and 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau commenced operations to 
scrutinize the practices of banks and payment intermediaries.6  In 2013, 
 
 
1. ASS’N FOR FIN. PROF’LS, PNC FIN. SERVS. GRP., 2016 AFP PAYMENT FRAUD AND 
CONTROL SURVEY 1 (2016), https://www.pnc.com/content/dam/pnc/com/pdf/ 
corporateandinstitutional/Treasury%20Management/ 
2016_AFP_Payments_Fraud_Report.pdf. 
2. Id. 
3. Third-Party Sender Identification Tool, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/third- 
party-sender-identification-tool (last visited Jan 4, 2017). 
4. A payment intermediary is an entity that performs some aspect of the payment 
processing on behalf of a client. These entities enter into agreements with a bank, customer, 
or another payment intermediary, assenting to aid in the processing of entries through the 
Automated Clearing House electronic wire transfer system (“ACH Network”). Id. 
5. See id. (explaining that with the proliferation of new payment models, there is an 
indefinable amount of payment intermediary business-case scenarios, which obfuscate the 
role of a financial institution involved in some aspect of ACH payment processing). 
6. See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action  Against 
Global Client Solutions for Processing Illegal Debt-Settlement Fees (Aug. 25, 2014), http:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-global-client- 
solutions-for-processing-illegal-debt-settlement-fees/; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
FTC Settlements Crack Down on Payment Processing Operations that Enabled ‘Google 
Money Tree’ Scammers to Charge Consumers $15 Million in Hidden Fees (Nov. 18,  2013), 
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the DOJ launched “Operation Choke Point,” an investigatory initiative 
aimed at penalizing third-party payment intermediaries and financial 
institutions that help scammers steal payments from customers despite 
clear evidence of fraud.7 Through this operation, the DOJ successfully 
prosecuted the owner of Check Site, Inc., Neil Godfrey, for using his 
third-party payment-intermediary company to help scammers steal 
millions of dollars from consumers.8 While the results of many similar 
investigations have been fruitful, the expansion of the third-party 
payment intermediary sector continues to expose customers to new and 
evolving threats of fraud.9 
According to the 2016 Association for Financial Professionals’ 
Payments Fraud and Control Survey, 73% of finance professionals 
reported that their companies experienced attempted or actual payments 
fraud in 2015.10  Further, 25% of corporations reported an economic   
loss caused directly by unauthorized or fraudulent transactions 
facilitated through the Automated Clearing House (“ACH”).11   While 
 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/11/ftc-settlements-crack-down- 
payment-processing-operation-enabled; See also Managing Risks in Third-Party Payment 
Processor Relationships, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (July, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/ 
regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum11/managing.html (stating that federal 
regulators advise financial institutions to have appropriate risk management and control 
procedures to ensure compliance with federal regulation and project consumers against 
payment fraud committed by third party intermediaries). 
7. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, WHAT IS OPERATION CHOKE POINT 1 (2015), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/banking_and_payment_systems/payment-fraud/ 
ib_what_is_operation_choke_point52815.pdf. 
8. Press Release, U.S. DOJ, California Payment Processing Company Owner Pleads 
Guilty (July 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-payment-processing- 
company-operator-pleads-guilty-fraud (elucidating that Godfrey both aided scammers find 
banks that were willing to ignore red flags and helped the fraudulent merchants stay off the 
radar of other banks and regulators so that the fraud could continue). 
9. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 6 (stating that Global Client Solutions had 
paid $6 million to settle charges by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from a claim 
alleging that it violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule by making it possible for debt- 
settlement companies to charge consumers illegal fees upfront); Federal Trade Comm’n, 
supra note 6 (disclosing that the Federal Trade Commission cracked down of Process 
America, a third-party payment intermediary, which ignored plainly deceptive statements on 
merchant’s websites that enabled ‘Google Money Tree’ scammers to steal $15 million from 
consumers through unauthorized ACH entries). 
10. ASS’N FOR FIN. PROF’LS, supra note 1, at 28 (detailing how “The Association for 
Financial Professionals” conducts its yearly survey, which draws on the knowledge of 
corporate practitioner members to provide fraud data analysis in the area of bank relation 
management, risk management, payments and financial accounting reporting). 
11. ASS’N FOR FIN. PROF’LS, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that the ACH Network is a 
batch processing system in which financial institutions electronically transfer funds through 
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ACH transactions are generally considered to be a safe form of  
payment, the increase of third-party senders (“Third-Party Senders”)12 
has exposed financial institutions to a greater level of compliance, 
credit, and legal risk.13 The increased risk comes coupled  with  
increased contention; when a financial institution or originator enter into 
contracts with these third-party intermediaries instead of direct 
agreements with each other, the responsibilities and potential liabilities 
of each party becomes less clear.14 Even more troublesome, payment 
intermediaries are choosing to originate ACH transactions for other 
payment intermediaries, creating multiple, nested layers between a 
customer and his bank.15 This  “nesting”  of  third-party  relationships 
adds complexity to the ACH transaction and further augments the 
potential for error and fraud.16 
To help reduce the potential for payment fraud, the National 
Automated Clearing House Association (“NACHA”)17 publishes 
Operating Rules that provide the legal foundation for the ACH  
electronic payment system (“ACH Newtork”).18 Since its inception, 
NACHA  has  continually  amended  its  Operating  Rules  in  order  to 
 
debit or credit entries). 
12. See Third-Party Senders, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/third-party- 
senders (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (explaining how NACHA coins the term Third-Party 
Senders as a type of third party payment intermediary). 
13. See Linda McGlasson, ACH Fraud: Avoid 3rd-Party Risk, BANK INFO SEC. (June 
22, 2010), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/ach-fraud-avoid-3rd-party-risks-a-2678 
(illustrating a recent case in which a court analyzed the responsibilities of an ODFI when 
contracting with Third-Party Senders). 
14. See Clinton Plumbing & Heating of Trenton, Inc. v. Ciaccio, No. 09-2751, 2010 
WL 4224473 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010) (demonstrating the increase in error risks that occurs 
when third parties enter the ACH Network). 
15. NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES: 
ODFI BEST PRACTICES TO CLOSE THE GAP AN ACH RISK MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER 12 
(2009) [hereinafter THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES], http://www.achthirdparty.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/08/thirdpartysenderwhitepaper.pdf (explaining the complex web 
of obligations and potential liabilities created by nesting payment intermediaries). 
16. Id. 
17. What is ACH?: Quick Facts About Automated Clearing House Network, NACHA 
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nacha.org/news/what-ach-quick-facts-about-automated- 
clearing-house-ach-network (stating that NACHA is a nonprofit association representing 
nearly 11,000 financial institutions that the development, administration, and governance of 
the ACH Network). 
18. How the Rules Are Made, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/how-rules-are- 
made (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (explaining that the Operating Rules define the roles and 
responsibilities of financial institution members and establish clear guidelines for each 
network participant in order to ensure millions of payments occur smoothly each day). 
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improve the quality and efficiency of the ACH Network.19 Between  
2013 and 2014, NACHA incorporated additional provisions to Article II 
of the Operating Rules, which governs the potential liabilities of each 
party to an ACH transaction.20 Notably, this recent amendment 
concerned the obligations of an Originating Depository Financial 
Institution (“ODFI”) when it originates ACH entries that are initiated by 
a Third-Party Sender.21 
Prior to this amendment, courts consistently found that an ODFI 
is required to indemnify a Receiving Depository Financial Institution 
(“RDFI”) from any claim resulting even remotely from a violation of 
the warranty provisions.22 However, there is little case law that directly 
examines how the recent amendments to the Operating Rules would 
affect an ODFI’s obligations and potential liabilities when its  
originating entries are initiated through a third-party intermediary.23 
Though NACHA has reiterated that ODFIs bear the bulk of the risk 
when originating ACH transactions, the issue becomes more nuanced 
when “nested” third parties (“Nested-Third-Party Sender”)24 initiate 
entries through ODFIs on behalf of originators with high return rates, 
such as payday lenders.25 
 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, 2016 ACH RULES: A  COMPLETE 
GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, § 2 (2016) [hereinafter 
NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016)]; see also NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, 
2016 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH 
NETWORK, § 2 (2014) [hereinafter NACHA OPERATING RULES (2014)]. 
22. PFG Precious Metals, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 C 7709, 2012 WL 404187 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2012) (holding that the warranty provision required the ODFI to indemnify 
the RDFI); Sec. First Network Bank v. C.A.P.S., Inc., No. 01 C 342, 2003 WL 22299011 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2003). 
23. See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3 (delineating the 
relationship between an ODFI and Third-Party Senders). 
24. For purposes of this Note, Nested-Third-Party Sender shall include any entity 
between an ODFI and an Originator, besides the Third-Party Sender with which it has an 
operating agreement. See Third-Party Sender Registration Rule: Understanding the New 
Rule & the Broader Business Context, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/events/repeat- 
webinar-understanding-third-party-sender-registration-rule-what-you-need-know (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2017) (elucidating the introduction of Nested-Third-Party Sender’s into the 
ACH Network). 
25. See Press Release, NACHA, ACH Operations Bulletin #2-2014: ACH Transactions 
Involving Third-Party Senders and Other Payment Intermediaries (Dec. 30, 2014) 
[hereinafter NACHA Bulletin 2-2014], https://www.nacha.org/news/ach-operations- 
bulletin-2-2014-ach-transactions-involving-third-party-senders-and-other-payment 
(discussing a 2014 amendment to the definition of a Third-Party Sender and its implications 
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This Note analyzes the scope of an ODFI’s liability in instances 
where a claim results from an ACH entry made through a Nested-Third- 
Party Sender. Part II explains the typical parties to an ACH transaction 
and provides examples to help illustrate the process.26 Part III examines 
the additional risks involved when a Nested-Third-Party Sender initiates 
an ACH entry.27  Part IV examines an ODFI’s role in mitigating the  
risks associated with Third-Party Senders and discusses the implications 
of NACHA’s new Third-Party Sender Registration Rule (effective  
2017) on the risk mitigating duties of an ODFI.28 
 
II. THE ACH TRANSACTION 
 
The ACH Network moves money and information from an 
account at one bank to an account at another bank through Direct 
Deposit and Direct Payment.29 Each year, the ACH Network transmits 
over $40 trillion in electronic financial transactions, and processes more 
than 20% of the total electronic payments in the U.S.30 In order to 
discern the risks associated with the influx of Nested-Third-Party 
Senders into the ACH Network, it is important to understand the 
different parties involved in a typical ACH transaction. 
 
A. Parties to the ACH Transaction 
 
Within a typical ACH transaction, there are five parties 
involved:  (1) the originating company or individual (“Originator”);  (2) 
 
 
on financial institutions); Press Release, NACHA, ACH Operations Bulletin #1-2014: 
Questionable ACH Debit Origination: Roles and Responsibilities of ODFIs and RDFIs 
(Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter NACHA Bulletin #1-204], https://www.nacha.org/news/ach- 
operations-bulletin-1-2014-questionable-ach-debit-origination-roles-and-responsibilities 
(explaining that the highest risk-originators are those not engaged in legitimate business 
practices which leads historic patterns of unauthorized returns); Devon Marsh,  
Commentary: ACH Return Rates, and the Case for Transparency, NACHA (June 11, 2015), 
https://www.nacha.org/news/commentary-ach-return-rates-and-case-transparency. 
26. See infra Part II. 
27. See infra Part III. 
28. See infra Part IV. 
29. Direct Deposit and Direct Payment via ACH, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/ 
payments (last visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
30. History and Network Statistics, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/ach-network/ 
timeline (last visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
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the ODFI; (3) the ACH Operator;31 (4) the RDFI; and (5) the receiving 
company or individual (“Receiver”).32 For an ACH  transaction  to 
occur, a Receiver must authorize an Originator to initiate the ACH entry 
(credit or debit) to the Receiver’s account at the RDFI.33 The Originator 
agrees to initiate the entry at his ODFI according to the arrangement 
made with the Receiver.34 The  ODFI  receives  payment  instructions 
from the Originator and forwards the entry to the ACH Operator, who 
transmits the entry to the RDFI.35 After verifying that it  holds  the 
account by checking the account and routing numbers on the 
transmission, the RDFI posts the entry to the account of the Receiver.36 
In a typical credit entry, the payor (Originator) initiates the entry  
through its bank (ODFI), which electronically transfers money into the 
payee’s (Receiver) bank account at the RDFI.37 In a typical debit entry, 
the payee (Originator) initiates the entry through its bank (ODFI) by 
requesting that funds be removed from the account of the payor 
(Receiver) at the RDFI.38 
To illustrate a credit entry, suppose Company A holds an 
account with Bank of America and employs Employees B and C, who 
hold bank accounts at TD Bank and Citibank respectively.39  Company  
A does not want to pay its employees with paper checks every week, so 
instead it asks Employee B and C to provide their bank account  
numbers in order to direct deposit payroll  into  their  accounts. 
Employee B and C authorize Company A to initiate this credit entry by 
 
31. An ACH Operator is a clearing facility, which receives and processes batches of 
electronic ACH entries from ODFIs. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 
4. 
32. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 4  (explaining  the 
typical parties to an ACH transaction). 
33. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4 (explaining how each ACH transaction is governed by 
agreement, and discussing how the NACHA ACH Operator Rules binds each member bank 
who must agree to in order to send and receive ACH entries). 
34. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4. 
35. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4. 
36. NACHA, supra note 17, at 4. 
37. KAREN FURST & DANIEL E. NOLLE, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, 
ACH PAYMENTS: CHANGING USER AND CHANGING USES 2 (Oct., 2005), https:// 
www.occ.treas.gov/topics/bank-operations/bit/ach-policy-paper-6.pdf. 
38. Id. 
39. Cf. Automated Clearing House Transactions: Overview, FED. FIN. INST. 
EXAMINATION COUNSEL, http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/ 
olm_059.htm (proving additional examples of the types of parties that typically engage in an 
ACH transaction) (last visited January 4, 2017). 
  
 
2017] NESTED PAYMENT INTERMEDIARIES 411 
providing their banking and routing numbers. Once Company A 
(Originator) receives authorization, it initiates the ACH transactions by 
providing Bank of America (ODFI) with Employee B and C’s 
(Receivers) bank information and the amount which is owed to each. 
Bank of America then submits this information to an ACH Operator, 
which forwards the credit entry to TD Bank and Citibank (RDFIs). TD 
Bank and Citibank verify that they hold the Employee B and C’s  
account by authenticating the routing and account numbers on the entry, 
and then credit that account in the amount transmitted from Bank of 
America. 
To demonstrate a debit entry, suppose student-payor (Receiver) 
wants to make a payment to lender-payee (Originator) on his student 
loans. Instead of sending a paper check to the lender to repay the 
principal and interest on the loan each month, student provides the 
lender with the routing and account number for his account at Bank of 
America (RDFI) and authorizes a withdrawal of $100 on the first of  
each month. Lender then provides the student’s bank information to TD 
Bank (ODFI) and the amount that is owed to the lender. TD Bank then 
submits this information to the ACH Operator, which forwards the debit 
entry to Bank of America (RDFI). After verifying the account and 
routing number, Bank of America (RDFI) debits student’s (Receiver) 
account for $100. 
 
B. NACHA Rules Governing Dispute Resolution 
 
Disputes typically arise when a customer (Receiver) reports an 
unauthorized debit to his bank account.40 The Operating Rules state that 
the Receiver must report unauthorized ACH debit transactions to the 
RDFI within fifteen calendar days from the date the RDFI sends or 
makes available to the Receiver information relating to the debit entry.41 
If such a report is made, the RDFI is obligated to promptly credit the 
amount of the debit entry.42 If a claim arises from a dispute as to the 
authorization status of an ACH entry, an RDFI can typically rely on the 
 
40. See ODFI Liability for Breach of Warranty, NACHA (Mar. 28, 2003), https:// 
www.nacha.org/news/odfi-liability-breach-warranty (illustrating that a customer begins the 
dispute process by contesting a debit entry on his bank account). 
41. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21. 
42. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21. 
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Operating Rules warranties to recover that amount from an ODFI.43 
Under Article II of the Operating Rules, an ODFI sending an 
entry to an RDFI warrants, among other things, that the entry: (1) is in 
accordance with proper authorization provided by both the Receiver and 
Originator; (2) is for an amount which on the settlement date will be due 
and owing to the Originator from the Receiver or for a sum specified by 
the Receiver to be paid to the Originator; and (3) contains the correct 
account and routing number of the Receiver.44 If a claim against an  
RDFI arises directly or indirectly from a breach of any of these 
warranties, Article II of the Operating Rules requires the ODFI to 
indemnify and defend the RDFI.45 
For example, supposed in the student loan debit entry scenario 
above, TD Bank erroneously submits the debit entry to Bank of 
America a week too early; yet Bank of America is unaware of the 
agreement between student and lender, so it debits student’s account for 
$100 and returns the entry to TD Bank. A few days later, student  
checks his bank account and it is $100 short so he requests that Bank of 
America refund his account for the amount of the unauthorized 
transaction. Because TD Bank warranted that on the settlement date the 
entry was for an amount that was owed to lender from student, TD Bank 
would be required to indemnify Bank of America if student brings a 
claim for the loss of his $100 since it resulted from a breach of 
Operating Rules warranties.46 
Article II previously included a catchall provision, which 
required an RDFI to indemnify an ODFI from any claim resulting from 
“the debiting or crediting of the entry to a receivers account.”47   The 
 
43. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining that an 
ODFI’s potential liability under the Rules for breach of warranty is not limited to the return 
time frames, but is limited only by the statute of limitations for breach of contract claims 
under the applicable state law; for example, the ODFI’s liability for a breach of warranty 
exists for seven years in some states). 
44. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4. 
45. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4.5.1. 
46. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2. See Sec. First Network 
Bank, Inc., No. 01 C 342, 2003 WL 22299011, at *21-22 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2003) 
(demonstrating a similar situation in which the ODFI was required to indemnify the RDFI 
for a breach of the NACHA warranties). 
47. See NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, 2013 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE 
GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, § 2 (2013) (containing 
no catchall provision); But see NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, 2009 ACH 
RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, § 
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most recent amendment to Article II qualifies the catchall language by 
including: 
 
[T]he debiting or crediting . . . in accordance with the 
terms of the Entry, including any claims, demands, 
losses, liabilities, or expenses, and/or attorney’s fees and 
costs that result, either directly or indirectly, from the 
return of one or more items or Entries of the Receiver 
due to insufficient funds caused by a Debit entry.48 
 
The added qualifying language narrows the scope of claims for 
which an ODFI must indemnify an RDFI by limiting an ODFI’s duty to 
indemnify to only claims that arise from an RDFI’s actions that are in 
accordance with “the terms of the entry.”49 Yet, the influx of Third- 
Party Senders into the ACH Network has increased the potential for 
error and dulled the precision of that qualification because the “terms of 
the entry” are typically disputed when multiple layers exist between an 
Originator and an ODFI. 
 
C. Regulatory Oversight 
 
In addition to NACHA’s Operating Rules, state and federal 
governments also promulgate regulations governing the roles and 
responsibilities of parties using the electronic wire transfer system.50 
The regulations under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“Regulation 
E”), The Banking Secrecy Act (“BSA”), and the Uniform Commercial 
Code all regulate this sector by establishing the rights, liabilities, and 
responsibilities of parties in electronic fund transfers.51 The focus of 
these acts is to protect the rights of consumers who use the ACH 
Network, requiring financial institutions to refund their customers’ 
accounts   for   unauthorized   entries   if   timely   notice   is   given.52 
 
2 (2009) (containing the catchall provision). 
48. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4.1. 
49. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.4.1. 
50. See Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J. 347, 364 
(1994) (discussing the macroeconomic purpose of government fund transfer laws). 
51. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2016); Bank Secrecy 
Act of 1970 § 202, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2015); U.C.C. Article 4A (2012). 
52.   12 C.F.R. § 205; 31 U.S.C § 5311; U.C.C. Article 4A. 
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Furthermore, these laws establish the required procedures for resolving 
account errors and disputes when the financial institution disagrees with 
a consumer as to whether an error occurred.53 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) 
implements the regulations for the BSA, which are intended to deter and 
detect the misuse of our nation’s financial institutions through fraud or 
other criminal schemes.54  The regulations require every national bank  
to have a system of internal controls monitoring its customers’ accounts 
and to file suspicious activity reports when it detects any certain known 
or suspected violations of federal law.55 Interestingly, the regulation 
does not include a Third-Party Sender provision to outline the 
responsibilities of financial institutions when these entities become 
involved in an ACH transaction.56 
To ensure that the Operating Rules comply with the federal 
regulations, NACHA collaborates with multiple agencies such as the 
Federal Reserve, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the United 
States Department of Treasury, and the OCC.57 While NACHA assists 
these regulatory agencies in protecting the interests of customers by 
regularly responding to inquiries, it also aims “to protect[] the interests 
of private sector rulemaking and network participants.”58 Moreover, 
because federal law provides little insight into the obligations of 
payment intermediaries in the ACH Network, NACHA’s Operating 
Rules are the authoritative legal framework that governs the 
relationships between these third-party entities and financial 
institutions.59 
 
 
 
 
53.   12 C.F.R. § 205; 31 U.S.C § 5311; U.C.C. Article 4A. 
54. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 Regulations, 12 C.F.R § 21.11 (2016) (explaining that 
regulation ensures that national banks file a Suspicious Activity Report when they detect a 
known or suspected violation of Federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money 
laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act). 
55. Id. 
56. See id. (remaining silent on the roles and responsibilities of Third-Party Senders); 
12 C.F.R § 205 (2016) (remaining silent on the roles and responsibilities of Third-Party 
Senders). 
57. Government Relations, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/government (last 
visited Jan 4, 2017). 
58. Id. 
59. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25. 
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III. PAYMENT INTERMEDIARIES AND RISK 
 
The potential for misuse or fraud of the ACH Network exists in 
all payment channels; however, the most problematic activity occurs in 
the origination of ACH debits through third parties.60 The most  
common risk is fraud, which arises frequently when an illicit 
telemarketer or online merchant obtains the consumer’s account and 
routing information through coercion or deception and initiates an 
unauthorized ACH debit transfer.61 For example, one of the most 
common types of ACH scam is fraudulent prizes or sweepstakes, where 
scammers contact individuals informing them that they won a cash prize 
and request their bank account information to complete the transfer.62 
Another critical risk of third-party intermediaries is fund 
misplacement, which can be further complicated by a third-party 
intermediary declaring bankruptcy.63 The risks are exacerbated when 
multiple layers of payment intermediaries nest between a customer and 
his financial institution.64 Because each nested layer has access to the 
customer’s routing and account information, there is greater potential  
for the submission of unauthorized debit entries from accounts of 
unwary customers.65 Once the funds are misplaced among layers of 
nested third parties, the blame game begins.66 
 
 
60. See Michael Bernard et al., Supervisory Insight, Managing Risks in Third-Party 
Payment Processor Relationships, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (July 15, 2014), https:// 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum11/managing.html 
(elucidating that Third-Party payment intermediaries create the most risk for fraud and fund 
misplacement in the ACH network). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (explaining that common occurrences of fraud entail an illicit telemarketer or 
online merchant contacting a consumer and obtaining his bank information to initiate an 
fraudulent ACH entry under terms that are not fully understood by the consumer). 
63. See Doug Walker, Release: Data Processing Services of Ga. Work with Federal 
Authority After Problems with Deposits, ROME NEWS TRIBUNE (May 17, 2013), http:// 
www.northwestgeorgianews.com/rome/release-data-processing-services-of-ga-working- 
with-federal-authorities/article_00319fb5-664b-55ea-a103-9099106a1b9f.html (providing 
insight into the federal investigation of Data Processing Services of Georgia, a Nested- 
Third-Party Sender that mishandled upwards of eight million dollars through the ACH 
network, which resulted in multiple Third-Party Senders declaring bankruptcy). 
64. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12. 
65. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12. 
66. See In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x 367, 368 (9th Cir. 2015) (exemplifying 
the “blame game”, i.e., when a third party service provider declares bankruptcy after 
debiting millions of dollars from employers accounts). 
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A. Payment Intermediaries 
 
A payment intermediary is an entity like a Third-Party Sender 
which Originators and/or ODFIs use for outsourcing payment services 
(See Figure A).67 The NACHA definition of a Third-Party Sender 
focuses on two fundamental characteristics of the Third-Party Sender’s 
relationship with Originators and ODFIs: (1) the Third-Party Sender  
acts as an intermediary between the Originator and the ODFI; and (2) 
the Third-Party Sender (rather than the Originator) has the agreement 
(“Origination Agreement”) with the ODFI.68 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasingly, financial institutions are entering into depository 
relationships with payment intermediaries because they can earn 
attractive transaction fees.70 Yet, the additional income comes at a cost; 
financial institutions that allow Third-Party Senders to establish deposit 
relationships for the purposes of processing transactions may find that 
these relationships expose the institutions to a greater level of risk and 
potential liability.71  The heightened exposure derives from the riskiness 
 
67. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT: THIRD PARTY 
SECURITY ASSURANCE 4 (2014), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/ 
PCI_DSS_V3.0_Third_Party_Security_Assurance.pdf (defining Third-Party Sender and 
providing numerous examples of entities that act in the role). 
68. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 4. 
69. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 5 (denoting diagram as 
Figure A). 
70. Bernard et al., supra note 60. 
71. JILL FOREST, 2015 NACHA RULES, SAME DAY ACH AND REGULATION E CHANGES, 
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of the Third-Party Sender’s clients, because the ODFI may initiate ACH 
entries for clients that engage in deceptive, abusive, or  illegal 
practices.72 Moreover, financial institutions that enter into agreements 
with Third-Party Senders may be viewed as facilitating practices of the 
Third-Party Sender’s clients and could potentially be liable to an RDFI 
whose customer reports an unauthorized transaction on his bank 
account.73 
One of the most common types of Third-Party Sender is a 
payroll company.74 Typically, a payroll company enters into an 
originating agreement with an ODFI, which allows the Third-Party 
sender to initiate ACH entries on behalf of the financial institution.75 
When an employer contracts with a payroll company to complete its 
ACH credits to employees, the underlying transaction is generally split 
into two related ACH entries:  (1) the payroll processor initiates an  
ACH debit to obtain payroll funds from the employer; and (2)  the 
payroll processor initiates an ACH credit to complete the payment to the 
employee on behalf of the employer.76 For instance, if a company 
(Originator) hires a payroll company (Third-Party Sender) to do its 
weekly payroll, the company would authorize the payroll company to 
complete two separate transactions: (1) to initiate an ACH debit entry 
from the company’s account; and (2) to initiate an ACH credit entry to 
the employees’ accounts.77 
Where the primary relationship is unclear and there is a dispute 
as to the authorization status of an entry, the responsibilities of the 
Originator, ODFI, and RDFI become muddled.78 If the payment 
intermediary is visible only to one party, it is clear that the intermediary 
acts on behalf of that party.79 Yet, other circumstances necessitate a 
deeper  inquiry  into  intermediaries’  relationships  to  confirm  its role, 
 
 
THE CLEARING HOUSE PAYMENTS ASS’N 6 (2015), http://www.nyba.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/05/CS6_NACHA_Rules.pdf. 
72. Id. at 20. 
73. McGlasson, supra note 13 (discussing a 2014 amendment to the definition of a 
Third-Party sender and its implications on financial institutions). 
74. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9. 
75. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25. 
76. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25. 
77. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25. 
78. NACHA Bulletin 1-2014, supra note 25. 
79. NACHA Bulletin 1-2014, supra note 25. 
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including its activities in obtaining authorizations from different 
parties.80 A recent amendment to the NACHA Operating Rule clarifies 
the more opaque relationship by outlining the obligations of a Third- 
Party Sender.81 
 
B. The Obligations of a Third-Party Sender 
 
In 2014, NACHA incorporated a new rule that defines the 
obligations of Third-Party Senders, ODFIs, and Originators that use 
Third-Party Senders.82 Under Operating Rule § 2.15.2, a Third-Party 
Sender warrants “the authorization of each entry it originates through 
the ODFI and agrees to indemnify the ODFI from and against any 
claims, demands, losses, liabilities and expenses that result directly or 
indirectly from the failure of the Originator to perform its obligations as 
an Originator under these rules.”83 Further, under Operating Rule § 
2.15.3, “a Third-Party Sender that is performing any of the obligations 
of an ODFI warrants that it is legally able to perform the requirements 
otherwise applicable to an ODFI.”84 However, the Third-Party Sender’s 
performance of any of the obligations of an ODFI does not relieve the 
ODFI of any of its obligations under the Operating Rules.85 
The overlap of responsibility is where the “blame game” 
remains.86 Suppose that (1) a Third-Party Sender submits an entry on 
behalf of an ODFI and the authorization status of that entry is disputed; 
or (2) a Third-Party Sender declares bankruptcy while in the process of 
transmitting an entry to a Receiver’s account.87  With the proliferation   
of payment intermediaries, the possibility of a claim that fits into one of 
these areas of uncertainty increases.88  In the first instance, because both 
 
80. NACHA Bulletin 2-2014, supra note 25. 
81. NACHA, supra note 3. 
82. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.2. 
83. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.2. 
84. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3. 
85. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3. 
86. See In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x 367, 368 (9th Cir. 2015) (exemplifying 
the “blame game”, i.e., when a third party service provider declares bankruptcy after 
debiting millions of dollars from employers accounts). 
87. Id. (providing an example of this occurrence). 
88. Joan Goodchild, ACH Fraud: Why Criminals Love This Crime, CSO ONLINE 
(Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2125833/malware-cybercrime/ach- 
fraud—why-criminals-love-this-con.html. 
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the ODFI and Third-Party Sender have warranted that the ACH entry 
was authorized, the Third-Party Sender will need to indemnify the 
ODFI, who in turn will need to indemnify the RDFI against any claim 
brought by a Receiver.89 However, when the parties dispute the “terms 
of the entry,” the resulting liabilities are unclear. Under (2), if a Third- 
Party Sender declares bankruptcy in the process of disputing the “terms 
of an entry,” a court may still find an ODFI liable to an RDFI regardless 
of the ODFIs operating agreement with the Third-Party Sender.90 
 
C. Nesting Third-Party Senders 
 
The transaction between an Originator, Third-Party Sender, and 
an ODFI becomes even more complicated when two or more additional 
payment intermediaries nest.91 A Nested Third-Party Sender  is  any 
entity whose services are contracted by another Third-Party Sender.92 
For instance, this might occur when a smaller payroll company  
contracts with a larger payroll company that has a better relationship 
with an ODFI and can more efficiently process the smaller payroll 
company’s ACH entries.93 Moreover, when there are multiple nested 
third parties, the responsibilities and potential liability of the ODFI and 
RDFI are even less clear.94 
To illustrate, suppose aforementioned Payroll Company B 
(Third-Party Sender) has an agreement with Payroll Company C  
(Nested Third-Party Sender), who in turn has a depository agreement 
with an ODFI.95 The relationship and potential liabilities between 
Payroll Company B and ODFI are still unclear under Operating Rule § 
2.15.3.96 If the ODFI terminated its relationship with Payroll Company 
C, all parties to that transaction—Payroll Company B, all of its clients, 
 
 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 23. 
92. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 2. 
93. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 4. 
94. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9. 
95. See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3 (requiring the 
Third-Party Sender to warrant that it can legally perform the requirements otherwise 
applicable to the ODFI, such as warranting the authorization of ACH entries submitted to 
RDFIs). 
96. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.15.3. 
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and its clients’ employees—are impacted.97 In these situations, a Third- 
Party Sender like Payroll Company B will be unable to complete the 
second stage of its clients’ companies’ ACH entries (the credit 
transaction), which will likely result in a loss of funds for the client’s 
employees.98 Due to the lack of regulation and case law governing the 
relationship between Nested-Third-Party Senders, payroll companies in 
this situation generally are unsure of their potential liabilities to their 
clients companies.99 
 
D. Case Law Demonstrating the Increased Risk of Nested-Third- 
Party Senders 
 
The federal courts have not made a direct ruling on the proper 
allocation of risk created by payment intermediaries; yet, the 9th Circuit 
affirmed the U.S. District Court of Idaho’s ruling which suggested that 
even if the Third-Party Sender is acting on behalf of the Originator, the 
ODFI should bear the bulk of the risk resulting from its involvement 
with a particular ACH transaction.100 While the new rule requires a 
Third-Party Sender to indemnify an ODFI for submitting an 
unauthorized entry, the question still remains as to the obligations of 
Nested-Third-Party Senders to other participants in the ACH 
Network.101 This issue would arise when there is a factual dispute as to 
the authorization status of an entry initiated by a Nested-Third-Party 
 
97. See In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x 367, 369 (9th Cir. 2015) (demonstrating 
the situation in which a Third-Party Sender is unable to complete its clients’ companies’ 
ACH entries). 
98. Id. 
99. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing the risks 
associated when terminating relationships with Nested-Third-Party Senders). 
100. In re Payroll Am., Inc., 609 F.App’x at 369 (affirming the ruling of the lower 
court); Gugino v. Greater Rome Bank, 489 B.R. 252, at 257 (D. Idaho 2013) (ruling that, in 
a bankruptcy proceedings, an ODFI was not liable to a client of a third-party sender that 
initiated ACH transactions through the ODFI because the client failed to demonstrate either 
that (1) the ODFI had dominion over the money transferred through the ACH Network; (2) 
the ODFI was not an entity for whose benefit the ACH transactions were made; and (3) the 
ODFI was not a subsequent transferee); See also Clinton Plumbing & Heating of Trenton, 
Inc. v. Ciaccio, No. 09-2751, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113215, at *28–34 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 
2010) (District Court of Pennsylvania finding that a claim against an RDFI resulting even 
remotely from an ODFI’s alleged breach of warranty would permit the RDFI to bring a 
third-party indemnification claim). 
101. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9 (providing a case 
study dealing with a Nested-Third-Party Sender). 
  
 
2017] NESTED PAYMENT INTERMEDIARIES 421 
Sender who has no direct contractual relationship with the Originator or 
Receiver.102 
In Gugino v. Greater Rome Bank,103 the Idaho District Court 
analyzed the relationships between Originators and Nested-Third-Party 
Senders in a bankruptcy proceeding.104 There, Payroll America, Inc., a 
local payroll processing company, collected money from its employer 
clients (Originators) and used that money to pay both the employee 
salaries and applicable taxing authorities.105 Payroll America (Third- 
Party Sender) contracted with Data Processing Services (“DPS”) 
(Nested-Third-Party Sender) to process its electronic transmissions 
through the ACH Network.106 DPS entered  into  an  originating 
agreement with Greater Rome Bank (ODFI), who in turn had an 
agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank for clearing and transmitting 
ACH entries.107 At some point, Payroll America misappropriated  
monies that had been held to pay its customers’ future tax bills and 
subsequently filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy.108 The Chapter 7 trustee 
brought a claim against Greater Rome Bank (ODFI) contending that 
Payroll America fraudulently transferred over $30 million to Greater 
Rome before filing bankruptcy.109 Ultimately, the court dismissed the 
claim against Greater Rome, ruling that its agreement with DPS 
(Nested-Third-Party Sender) did not establish liability to Payroll 
America’s (Third-Party Sender) clients (Originator).110 While this 
decision ruled that, in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, an ODFI 
is not liable to an Originator whose funds are misappropriated by a 
Nested-Third-Party Intermediary, there is still uncertainty as to the 
ODFI’s potential liability to the Receiver and RDFI when a Nested- 
Third-Party Sender initiates entries.111 
 
 
 
102. Bernard et al., supra note 60. 
103. 489 B.R. 252. 
104. Gugino, 489 B.R. at 255. 
105. Id. 
106.    Id. at 255–256. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109.    Id. at 255. 
110. Id. 
111. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing the risks 
associated when terminating relationships with Nested-Third-Party Senders). 
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IV. ODFI’S DUTY TO MITIGATE RISK 
 
In order to prevent these types of cases from arising, NACHA 
promulgated three new Operating Rules that require ODFI’s to mitigate 
the risks of Third-Party Senders.112 Now, ODFIs must: (1) enter into 
Originating Agreements with Third-Party Senders, which among other 
things allows the ODFI to audit the entity and its Originator’s 
compliance with the Rules;113 (2) utilize a commercially reasonable 
method to verify the identity of the Originator or Third-Party Sender at 
the time the ODFI enters into the Originating Agreement;114 and (3) 
perform due diligence with respect to the Third-Party Sender or 
Originator to form a reasonable belief that the entity has the capacity to 
perform its obligations under the Rules.115 Additionally, the new 
Operating Rules requires ODFIs to periodically review the activities of 
their Third-Party Senders, specifically monitoring the return rate for 
unauthorized transactions.116 
While these rules do encourage a more efficient ACH network, 
they do not regulate the relationships between Third-Party Senders and 
Nested-Third-Party Senders.117 NACHA’s Bulletin  seems  to  suggest 
that ODFIs should still bear the increased risk of these relationships 
because they are in the best position to monitor against potential 
fraud.118 Moreover, ODFIs are free to contract and collect fees with any 
third-party payment intermediary it chooses, but by doing so they  
should be prepared to assume the risks of fraud and error arising out of 
those agreements.119 
 
A. New NACHA Rule Requiring Third-Party Sender Registration 
 
Effective September 9, 2017, NACHA’s new Operating Rule 
will require ODFIs to identify and register their Third-Party Sender 
 
 
112. See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2. 
113. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.2.2. 
114. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.1. 
115. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.3. 
116. NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.3. 
117. See NACHA OPERATING RULES (2016), supra note 21, at § 2.2.3. 
118. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12. 
119. FOREST, supra note 71, at 25. 
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customers in order to promote consistent due diligence and improve the 
quality of the ACH Network.120 As an initial registration, ODFIs must 
provide NACHA with basic registration information for each Third- 
Party Sender customer, including: (1) ODFIs name and contact 
information; (2) the name and principal place of business of the Third- 
Party Sender; (3) the routing number used in ACH transaction initiated 
by the Third-Party Sender; and (4) the company’s identification(s) of 
the Third-Party Sender.121 The new Operating Rule also provides for a 
supplemental registration requirement, which requires an ODFI to 
provide more specific information about a Third-Party Sender within  
ten days of an authorized request by NACHA.122 A request for 
supplemental registration is authorized if NACHA believes that the 
Third-Party Sender poses an escalated risk of financial loss to ACH 
participants, a violation of the Operating Rules, or an excessive return 
rate of unauthorized entries.123 
Notably, the new Operating Rule requires a Third-Party Sender 
to disclose to the ODFI any Nested-Third-Party Senders for which it 
transmits entries to the ODFI, prior to transmitting any entries for other 
Third-Party Senders.124 Moreover, a Third-Party Sender must provide  
the ODFI, upon request, the information necessary for the ODFI to 
complete registration for the Nested-Third-Party Sender within two 
banking days.125 Still, it is uncertain whether an ODFI’s notice of its 
relationship with a Nested-Third-Party Sender impacts its potential 
liabilities to other participants in the ACH Network.126  Overall, this  
new rule supports the notion that the most substantial obligation to 
prevent against fraud falls on the ODFI, but it does not go as far as 
requiring direct agreements between ODFIs and Nested-Third-Party 
Senders.127 
 
 
120. Third-Party Sender Registration, NACHA (2016), https://www.nacha.org/rules/ 
third-party-sender-registration (last visited February 7, 2017). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. See id. (remaining silent as to whether notice of a Nested-Third-Party Sender 
relationship impacts an ODFI’s potential liability). 
127. Id. 
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B. ODFI’s Capacity to Prevent Against Fraud in the ACH Network 
 
An ODFI must deal directly with the Third-Party Sender before 
any ACH transaction is to be initiated.128 Before agreeing to initiate a 
transaction on behalf of a Third-Party Sender, NACHA’s  new 
Operating Rule will require ODFIs to identify and register the entity.129 
During this registration period, an ODFI has the opportunity to assess 
the risk of the relationship with the Third-Party and verify the 
creditworthiness of this entity, including: (1) reviewing its financial 
history; (2) ensuring it has sufficient capitalization in relation to the 
volume of ACH transactions; (3) obtaining history of its ACH return 
rates; and (4) researching consumer complaints on the Better Business 
Bureau.130 While the Operating Rule does not require ODFIs  to  
examine Nested-Third-Party Senders with same degree of scrutiny, 
ODFIs should go beyond the Rule’s requirements and employ the same 
investigatory mechanisms to evaluate Nested Third Parties in order to 
alleviate their potential exposure.131 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation published a 
“Supervisory Approach to Institutions Establishing Account 
Relationships with Third-Party Senders,” which sets forth a list of 
specific risks that financial institutions should recognize and mitigate: 
(1) credit risks (charge back from unauthorized transactions); (2) 
operational risks; (3) compliance risks; (4) reputational risks; and (5) 
legal risks (class action lawsuits).132 Though this list sets forth a “best 
practice” for financial institutions, courts will likely consider this as 
evidence weighing against an ODFI if ever a claim resulted from an 
erroneous ACH transaction.133 
On the one hand, NACHA should require ODFIs to consider the 
 
128. See id. (explaining the relationship between the ODFI a Third-Party Sender and 
discussing how the 2013 amendment requires transparency between the two parties). 
129. Id. 
130. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 11; Third-Party Payment 
Processors—Overview, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNSEL, https://www.ffiec.gov/ 
bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_063.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2017). 
131. FOREST, supra note 71, at 26 (providing methods for an ODFI to alleviate potential 
exposure). 
132. Bernard et al., supra note 60. 
133. See THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing the 
responsibilities of ODFIs when entering into operating agreements with Third Party Service 
Providers). 
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impact to all ACH participants when determining whether to enter or 
terminate a depository agreement with a third-party-payment 
intermediary, particularly because ODFIs typically make a profit on 
these transactions.134 On the other hand, it may be unfair to require an 
ODFI to incur liability for unauthorized transactions initiated by 
Nested-Third-Party Senders with which the ODFI does not have an 
operating agreement.135 A possible solution to minimize the risk of 
Nested-Third-Party Senders could be a requirement that ODFIs must 
always have a direct originating agreement between it and any Third- 
Party Senders for which it originates entries.136 This requirement would 
minimize the risk of default or misallocation of funds that each nested- 
third-party intermediary places on all ACH participants.137 Still, even 
without this requirement, ODFIs will be given notice of each Nested- 
Third-Party Sender through its agreements with a Third-Party Sender. 
Therefore, ODFIs can better serve their customers by applying the same 
rigorous investigatory standards before originating ACH entries on 
behalf of a Nested-Third-Party Sender. 
 
C. RDFIs Incur the Bulk of Expenses for Unauthorized Entries 
 
For each returned unauthorized ACH entry, the RDFI incurs 
considerable cost.138 NACHA collected cost data from twenty-nine 
institutions that represent 82% of all ACH Network unauthorized  
returns in a year and found that the weighted average cost for RDFIs to 
handle unauthorized transactions was $5.97.139 However, the cost 
drastically fluctuated depending on the size of the RDFI, ranging from 
$1,800 per unauthorized transaction for a small RDFI to $2.30 for a 
large RDFI. 140 NACHA Operating Rules currently require an ODFI to 
pay a fee of less than $5.97 to an RDFI for any ACH debit returned as 
 
134. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12. 
135. FOREST, supra note 71, at 23. 
136. FOREST, supra note 71, at 25. 
137. THIRD-PARTY SENDER CASE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 12–14. 
138. FOREST, supra note 71, at 4. 
139. FOREST, supra note 71, at 23 (explaining that the costs included labor, systems, and 
office space allocations but did not take into consideration cost related to customer contact 
via branch, compliance related to Reg. E disputes, and costs associated with obtaining a 
Written Statement of Unauthorized Debit). 
140. FOREST, supra note 71, at 23. 
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unauthorized.141 While the reimbursement fee is aimed at  helping 
RDFIs with a portion of the compensation for unauthorized entries, it is 
clear that smaller institutions are most negatively impacted by an 
ODFI’s lack of due diligence.142 
If ODFIs were required to fully indemnify an RDFI for  all 
claims and damages resulting from contested or unauthorized ACH 
Entries, ODFIs would be incentivized to implement strict screening 
before entering into agreements with Third-Party Senders (and  
potential, hidden  Nested-Third-Party  Senders).143  Furthermore,  a 
stricter screening policy would promote a more efficient ACH Network 
for all parties, thereby increasing both customer and merchant 
satisfaction.144 Last, because a financial institution will typically 
participate in the ACH Network as an ODFI in one ACH entry and an 
RDFI in another, it is in the interests of all NACHA members to require 
implementation of a risk management system by the ODFI to protect 
against fraudulent entries submitted by Third-Party Senders.145 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The new Operating Rule governing Third-Party Sender 
registration will likely reduce the occurrences of fraud by requiring 
transparency for all Third-Party Senders between an ODFI and 
Originator. Yet, it is still unclear as to whether Operating Rule § 2.2.2.2 
would impose liability on an ODFI in the event that its contracted 
Third-Party Sender—or even a Nested-Third-Party Sender—commits 
fraud, misplaces funds, or declares bankruptcy. The Gugino case 
appears to reject this theory of liability in a bankruptcy proceeding, yet 
this decision is narrow and came down prior to the recent rule 
amendment.146  For judicial clarity, ACH participants will likely need to 
 
141. FOREST, supra note 71, at 23. 
142. FOREST, supra note 71, at 23. 
143. See FOREST, supra note 71, at 19–23 (discussing methods to improve the ACH 
Network, including strict screening of Third-Party Sender’s by the ODFI). 
144. NACHA, supra note 23 (explaining the National Automatic Clearing House 
Association’s view on the risk of accepting originating ACH transactions from Third 
Parties). 
145. PETE MARTINO, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP, ACH AND THIRD-PARTY PAYMENT 
PROCESSOR RELATIONSHIPS 18 (2014), https://www.kansascityfed.org/eventinfo/banking/ 
2014-AML-Third-Party%20Payment%20Processors%20and%20ACH%20Presentation.pdf. 
146. Gugino v. Greater Rome Bank, 489 B.R. 252, at 257 (D. Idaho 2013). 
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wait for a direct opinion on the issue that firmly defines the limits of 
liability in these situations. Overall, financial institutions should 
continue to take steps to protect consumers against the risk of nested 
payment intermediaries by strictly scrutinizing any ACH entry initiated 
by a Third-Party Sender. 
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